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THE CASE FOR CONTRIBUTION IN PATENT LAW
Bernard Chao*
Under tort law’s theory of contribution, when one party is sued, it can
implead other parties that may be jointly and severally liable and ask that
they pay their fair share of any judgment. Although contribution theory
has spread to numerous wide-ranging areas of the law, patent law is not
among them. Thus, when a manufacturer is sued for patent infringement,
it cannot seek contribution from the component supplier that included the
patented technology in its component. This omission from patent law has
generated surprisingly little commentary. In the few instances where an
accused infringer has sought a right of contribution, the district courts
have concluded that contribution is somehow preempted by 35 U.S.C.
271(c), which governs contributory infringement. This article explains
how these decisions have incorrectly conflated the two doctrines.
Contribution determines how to apportion damages between different
liable parties while contributory infringement helps identify which parties
are liable. Once the courts appreciate this distinction, they can and
should adopt contribution in patent law.
Contribution is typically thought of as a mechanism that equitably
spreads liability among different responsible parties. However, because
of the availability of indemnification agreements, contribution performs a
more limited version of that role in patent law. However, this article
identifies a much less expected benefit unique to patent law. Contribution
should lower royalty awards in component patent cases, an area where
awards have been shown to be excessive. Relying on the behavioral
economics concepts of “anchoring” and “coherence,” this article
compares how juries act under the current system with how they would
behave under a patent system applying contribution theory. The article
suggests that applying contribution will lead to lower royalty awards that
are based on the value of the individual components and not the larger
multi-component products.

I. Introduction ...................................................................................... 114

* Bernard Chao is an assistant professor at the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law.
Thanks to Viva Moffat, Fred Hadidi, Alan Chen, Paul Ohm, Harry Surden, Rebecca Aviel, Brian Love,
and Mark Lemley for their comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank both the participants
of the Samsung-Stanford Conference on Patent Remedies and my colleagues at the University of Denver
who attended my work in progress presentation. Both groups provided many valuable insights. Finally,
thanks to the sponsors of the Samsung–Stanford Patent Prize for their generosity.

113

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3

114

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

II. Disentangling Overcompensation from Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking ....................................................................... 119
III. Current Approaches ....................................................................... 125
A. Permissive Apportionment and the Status Quo .................... 125
B. Mandatory Apportionment and Legislative Gridlock ........... 127
C. Flaws With The Entire Market Rule ..................................... 130
IV. The Proposal: Adopting Tort Law‘s Theory of Contribution ........ 132
A. Anchoring Problems with Multi-Component Products ........ 134
B. Contribution and Coherence ................................................. 138
C. Contribution and Fairness ..................................................... 140
V. Reform from the Courts .................................................................. 146
A. Conflating Contribution with Contributory Infringement .... 146
B. Federal Court Authority ........................................................ 147
C. Application of Contribution In Patent Law .......................... 151
VI. Next Steps ...................................................................................... 152
A. Future Studies ...................................................................... 152
B. Changing Behavior ............................................................... 153
C. Indemnification ..................................................................... 154
D. Extraterritoriality .................................................................. 155
VII. Conclusion .................................................................................... 158

I. INTRODUCTION
Under tort law‘s theory of contribution, when one party is sued, it can
implead other parties that may be jointly and severally liable and ask
that they pay their fair share of any judgment. Although contribution
theory has spread to numerous areas of the law, patent law is not among
them. Thus, when a manufacturer is sued for patent infringement, it
cannot seek contribution from the component supplier that included the
patented technology in its component. This omission from patent law
has generated surprisingly little commentary. 1
1. See David Hricik, Remedies of the Infringer: The Use by the Infringer of Implied and
Common Law Federal Rights, State Law Claims, and Contract to Shift Liability for Infringement of
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1027, 1056 (1997) (stating that only the
patent statutes do not imply a right to contribution); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An
Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 21,
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This article fills this void and presents the multifaceted case for
contribution in patent law. From a doctrinal perspective, district courts
have incorrectly found that contribution is preempted by the statute
governing contributory infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). They arrive at
this decision by wrongly conflating tort law‘s theory of contribution and
patent law‘s theory of contributory infringement. By itself, correcting
this mistake does not provide the legal basis for adopting contribution.
The Supreme Court has said that the courts have the power to adopt
contribution in a particular area of federal substantive law only when
certain criteria are met. Fortunately, patent law fits squarely into one of
the specified tests. Courts (not Congress) have determined that patent
infringers are jointly and severally liable. Consequently, under
established Supreme Court precedent, courts have the authority to
determine whether the ancillary theory of contribution should also be
adopted.
The case for contribution does not rely on doctrinal justifications
alone. Compelling policy reasons for the courts to adopt contribution in
patent law also exist. Although contribution is typically thought of as a
mechanism that equitably spreads liability among different responsible
parties, that will not be its primary benefit in patent law. Since
companies that are responsible for the same infringement typically have
a relationship with each other, they are able to negotiate indemnification
agreements. In most cases, indemnification agreements can adequately
spread risk. However, in some situations, parties either do not or cannot
fairly negotiate an indemnification provision.
In those cases,
contribution provides an equitable default set of rules to allocate
liability.
But contribution provides a much more compelling and unexpected
policy benefit unique to patent law. It should lower royalty awards in
component patent cases, an area where awards have been shown to be
excessive. Overcompensation can be explained, at least in part, by
behavioral economics and ―anchors‖ that cause juries to calculate
royalty awards based on the value of the larger multi-component
products (e.g., an LCD TV) rather than the individual components (e.g.,
n.81 (1999) (―Whether patent law itself imposes any duty of contribution among joint tortfeasors is also
uncertain, although the few cases that have addressed this issue have held that it does not.‖).
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a semiconductor chip).
Contribution addresses the overcompensation problem by placing an
important reference point prominently before the jury. When a
manufacturer is sued for patent infringement, it will be able to implead
and seek contribution from the component supplier that included the
patented technology in its component. The jury will have to calculate
the component supplier‘s share of the liability. Behavioral economic
studies have demonstrated that people are good at relative valuations
(i.e., coherence). If patent juries exhibit coherence, they will frame their
determinations using the price of the supplier‘s components, which
should result in lower royalty awards based on the value of the
individual components instead of the larger multi-component products.
In Part II, I explain that reasonable royalty awards in patent cases are
excessive. Before arriving at this conclusion, I first disentangle the
discussion over the possible existence of overcompensation from the
debate about its causes. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro addressed these
issues together by arguing that patent royalties are systematically too
high due to ―patent holdup‖ and ―royalty stacking.‖2 In response, their
critics have also tied the two issues together and, by attacking the
economic model underlying Lemley and Shapiro‘s theory, they have
concluded that reasonable royalties are not excessive. Regardless of
whether patent holdup and royalty stacking are serious problems, the
data strongly suggests that royalties in component patent cases are too
high. Technology products incorporate hundreds, if not thousands, of
patents. Yet Lemley and Shapiro reported that the average royalty rate
in component patent cases was 9.98% of the entire product. Even if
there is a reasonable dispute over the source of overcompensation,
Lemley and Shapiro‘s critics have failed to seriously challenge the
existence of overcompensation in component patent cases.
In Part III, I describe three theories that are intended to prevent
excessive royalty awards in component patents cases, as well as each
theory‘s weaknesses. Two of those theories, permissive apportionment
and the ―entire market‖ rule, exist under current law and have proven
ineffective at curtailing overcompensation. The third theory, mandatory
2. Patent holdup refers to the situation where the patentee can threaten an injunction after the
accused infringer has already incurred sunk costs. Royalty stacking refers to the fact that many patents
cover the same product. See infra notes 5–12 and accompanying text.
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apportionment, is a proposed reform that has no chance of passing
Congress due to a deadlock between the technology and pharmaceutical
industries.
In Part IV, I argue that patent law should adopt tort law‘s theory of
contribution. Under this proposal, a manufacturer of a multi-component
product could implead its component supplier and demand that the
supplier share in any liability. Although contribution has been
traditionally thought of as a mechanism for equitably-spread liability
among different parties responsible for infringement, I argue that the
primary benefit of applying contribution to patent law will be to lower
the royalties awarded in component patent cases.
Relying on observations from behavioral economics, I explain how
juries overcompensate component patentees in the current system.
Patentees now generally choose to sue manufacturers of multicomponent products. This choice allows patentees to place anchors that
frame juries‘ determinations using the value of a multi-component
product as opposed to the value of component itself. Consequently,
royalty awards for component patents look like the awards we would
expect for patents that cover the entire multi-component product and not
just the component itself. Quite simply, these awards are too high.
However, contribution would change that result by taking advantage of
people‘s natural ability to make ―coherent‖ valuations. By requiring the
jury to determine the component supplier‘s liability, contribution places
an important reference point prominently before the jury, namely, the
price of the component. Once juries appreciate that information, they
will use it to frame their determination. This should result in lower
royalty awards that are actually based on the value of the component and
not the value of the larger multi-component product.
Applying contribution to patent law will also equitably spread
liability among the responsible parties. Although parties have the ability
negotiate indemnification agreements and thereby spread their risk,
contribution still has advantages in this context as well. In cases where
the parties are not in privity or when they have not negotiated their
relative risks, contribution will equitably assign liability among the
responsible parties.
In Part V, I explain why the courts can adopt contribution now.
Several district courts have incorrectly rejected the application of
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contribution in patent law. These courts have mistakenly conflated
contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) with the theory of
contribution and have found that the latter preempts the former.
However, contributory infringement and contribution are distinct
theories. Contributory infringement is a type of accessory liability. It
holds some parties liable for infringement even though they do not
directly infringe a patent themselves. In contrast, the tort theory of
contribution gives a party who is jointly and severally liable the right to
demand that other jointly and severally liable parties help pay any
damages.
I also argue in Part V that the courts have the authority to adopt
contribution in patent law. The Supreme Court has said that the courts
have that authority in some areas of substantive law but not in others.
These decisions outline three situations where the federal courts may
adopt contribution: (1) in substantive areas where the courts have
historically elaborated a general common law, (2) where a statute
implies a right of contribution, and (3) where contribution is ancillary to
other portions of the law that the courts have already developed.
Applying contribution to patent law fits squarely within the third
category. Because the courts have established that infringers are jointly
and severally liable through patent common law, the courts can also
adopt the ancillary theory of contribution.
Finally, in Part VI, I discuss next steps. First, I discuss the need for
additional empirical work. I only theorize why overcompensation
occurs. Although well-established concepts from behavioral economics
support this theory, it is not certain that those concepts translate to the
patent damages context. Thus, there is no proof that patent juries will
act in the manner described. Second, I try to identify, but not resolve,
some challenging issues that will arise under this new regime.
Specifically, I anticipate how companies and patent litigators might
react to a world with contribution. I also discuss the extraterritorial
implications of contribution.
There are undoubtedly additional
downstream affects that will emerge if contribution theory is adopted.
But this article only attempts to address some of the most likely
consequences.
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II. DISENTANGLING OVERCOMPENSATION FROM PATENT HOLDUP AND
ROYALTY STACKING
Before describing how contribution will address excessive royalty
awards, I first discuss whether there is an overcompensation problem at
all. Unfortunately, the debate over the existence of overcompensation in
patent law has been entangled in the related quarrel over the possible
source of any overcompensation. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro‘s
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking article is at the center of both
discussions.3 Relying on economic modeling and an empirical study,
Lemley and Shapiro say that reasonable royalty awards in patent cases
are systematically too high due to a combination of patent holdup and
royalty stacking. Under this theory, the problem is particularly
pronounced when the patented technology covers only one small
component of a larger complex product. I agree with part of this
analysis. In particular, this article relies on the data they collected from
reported patent decisions to show the existence of overcompensation.
However, I focus on another potential cause of this problem: that
overcompensation can also be explained, at least in part, by behavioral
economics and anchors that cause juries to calculate royalty awards
based on the value of the larger multi-component products (e.g., an LCD
TV) as opposed to the individual components (e.g., a semiconductor
chip). This article takes no position on whether patent holdup and
royalty stacking also cause overcompensation. Nonetheless, I briefly
discuss these theories here because critics who argue that there is no
overcompensation do so by criticizing patent holdup and royalty
stacking theory.
As a starting point, Lemley and Shapiro say that the ideal royalty is
the royalty that the patentee and infringer would negotiate prior to any
investment.4 Holdup occurs when a patentee can use an injunction to
threaten a defendant after it has already made a substantial investment in

3. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991
(2007).
4. Id. at 1996–99. Lemley and Shapiro call this the ―benchmark royalty level‖ and say it can be
described by the formula θ×B×V, where θ is the patent strength, B is the bargaining skill of the patent
holder, and V is the value of the patented feature to the end product in comparison to the next best
alternative.
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the design and development of its product.5 If the costs associated with
the defendant moving to a non-infringing alternative are high, a patentee
can obtain at least a portion of those costs in any recovery. 6 Thus, the
patentee‘s ex post recovery is higher than the rate the parties would have
negotiated ex ante (i.e., the amount the defendant would have paid for
the patent before making any investments). This is an inefficient result
because it allows the patentee‘s recovery to include costs that have
nothing to do with the patented invention.7 Surprisingly, Lemley and
Shapiro‘s economic model found that overcompensation occurred even
when the patent holder approached the defendant prior to any
investment.8 The accused infringers tend to litigate, especially when
confronted with weak patents. Holdup problems still occur because
litigation takes place after the accused infringers developed their
product.9 As a result, even when there is a later settlement, the value of
that settlement will reflect an element of holdup.
―Royalty stacking refers to situations in which a single product
potentially infringes on many patents and thus may bear multiple royalty
burdens.‖10 Of course any holdup problem is multiplied by the number
of patents that cover a product. Lemley and Shapiro argue that royalty
stacking causes various additional complications that result in an
inefficient reduction in output.11 For the purposes of the current
analysis, the specific details of these problems are not relevant.

5. Id. at 1992–93.
6. Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent
Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 561–62 (2008) (explaining how a patentee‘s leverage is
increased in view of high design around costs).
7. According to Lemley and Shapiro, ―[t]here is a consensus among antitrust authorities that
bilateral ex ante royalty negotiations promote competition and innovation by mitigating patent holdup.‖
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2163,
2164–65 (2007) (footnote omitted); see also Chao, supra note 6, at 561 (noting that ―the cost savings
associated with a design around has no relationship to the value that the patented invention contributes
to a product; it is simply the unfortunate side effect of resolving patent disputes after products are
designed and sold.‖).
8. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2004.
9. Id. at 2004–05.
10. Id. at 1993.
11. Id. at 2010–16 (discussing the problems of (1) rent splitting, (2) shutdown, and (3) Cournot
complements).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/3

8

Chao: THE CASE FOR CONTRIBUTION IN PATENT LAW

2011]

THE CASE FOR CONTRIBUTION IN PATENT LAW

121

Although Lemley and Shapiro have their supporters,12 they also have
numerous critics. John Golden,13 Gregory Sidak,14 and Einer Elhauge15
challenge the assumption that the patent holder should receive what it
could have negotiated ex ante (before the defendant began its
infringement). Although Golden concedes that patent holdup may occur
in certain situations, he argues that Lemley and Shapiro have failed to
prove that such problems are systematic.16 Elhauge goes one step
further and argues that many of Lemley and Shapiro‘s assumptions are
wrong. Elhauge says that when the correct assumptions are used, the
results show that patentees are actually undercompensated.17 Thomas
Cotter summarizes the differences between the two camps:
The disagreement between Lemley and his coauthors, on the one hand,
and critics such as Elhauge and Sidak, on the other, on whether patent
holdup is a form of market failure, therefore to a large extent boils down
to a disagreement over how best to divide the gains from innovation
between patentees and downstream users.18

Lemley and Shapiro‘s critics have focused too closely on the

12. Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L.
1151, 1172 (2009) (arguing that Lemley and Shapiro‘s theoretical model is correct); Mark A. Lemley &
Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786–88
(2007).
13. John Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111,
2139–40 (2007) (―[Lemley and Shapiro] beg the essential question by assuming that a patent holder
should receive no more than it would receive in the absence of a credible holdout threat . . . .‖).
14. J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for
Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 742 (2008) (―In light of
this option value to the infringer, one begins to see how the hypothetical benchmark royalty rate is in
fact biased downwards.‖).
15. Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive
Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 541 (2008) (―The Lemley-Shapiro analysis critically
depends on their assumption that the optimal benchmark royalty is θBv, which they base on the claim
that such a royalty rate ‗provides an efficient reward to innovators.‘ In fact, their recommended
benchmark bears no relation to the reward necessary to efficiently incentivize invention. Indeed, given
the premises, any royalty rate below vθ would underincentivize many socially desirable inventions.‖).
16. Golden, supra note 13, at 2135 (―Hence, consideration of how licensing negotiations look to
the patent holder provides substantial reason to suspect that contrary to Lemley and Shapiro‘s
conclusions, patent holders may not be ‗systematically overcompensated‘ even if they can use the threat
of an injunction to make credible holdout threats under certain circumstances.‖).
17. Elhauge, supra note 15, at 537.
18. Cotter, supra note 12, at 115.
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economic formulation of the holdup and royalty stacking issue and have
largely ignored the empirical data that was provided. Even if Lemley
and Shapiro are wrong about the source of the problem (i.e., patent
holdup and royalty stacking), their data still suggests that they are right
about the existence of an overcompensation problem.
This is
particularly true when the patent involved only covers a single
component of a multiple component product.
Lemley and Shapiro analyzed royalty rates in reported decisions
between 1982 and 2005.19 The study found that the average royalty rate
across all cases was 13.13% of the price of an infringing product.20
Breaking down the numbers further, royalty rates for cases involving
component inventions averaged 9.98% while the rate for patents that
covered an integrated product averaged 14.71%.21 An example of a
component patent might be technology that is related to implementing
wireless technology in a personal computer. Typically, that technology
is found in a single component, such as the wireless card, of the larger
multi-component product, the computer. As expected, awards for
component patents are lower than awards for integrated product patents.
However, the difference is extremely small when you consider how
many innovations may be found in a single product. Lemley and
Shapiro observe that ―the reduction in royalty rate for component
inventions is equivalent to the conclusion that there are on average less
than 1.5 components in a multi-component invention.‖22
But that number vastly understates the number of components found
in today‘s technology products. Televisions, cell phones, and computers
have many components incorporating hundreds, if not thousands, of
patented inventions.23 Varying estimates exist regarding the number of
patents required to produce a single product. For example, Goodman
and Myers examined the patents and patent applications that parties

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2030–31 (the sample size was small—forty seven cases).
Id. at 2032.
Id.
Id. at 2034.
See FED. TRADE COMM‘N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW POLICY 35 (2003) [hereinafter INNOVATION] (discussing how the large
number of incremental innovations results in patent thickets in the hardware and semiconductor fields),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ innovationrpt.pdf.
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declared essential to two different third-generation cellular
technologies.24 6,872 patents and patent applications were declared
essential to the Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA),
and 924 patents and patent applications were declared essential to the
CDMA 2000 standard.25 That being said, an evaluation panel estimated
that nearly 80% of the patents were actually not essential to the cellular
standards.26 Nevertheless, discounting the reported numbers by 80%
still leaves a hefty 1,374 patents and patent applications ―essential‖ to
WCDMA and 184 to CMDA 2000.
Michael Kramer provides more modest benchmarks. Relying on data
from various standards bodies, he found 101 essential patents for the
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard cellular
phones, 35 essential patents for the IEEE 802.11 local wireless standard,
and 87 essential patents for MPEG-2 and MPEG-4 standards.27
Both studies undoubtedly underestimate the number of patents that a
typical technology product uses. First, as Lemley and Shapiro note in
the context of the 802.11 standard, many companies provided letters of
assurance regarding licensing terms but did not identify specific patents
that are essential to the standard.28 Second, the only companies that
disclose patents to standards bodies are those that participate in the
making of that standard. Thus, other companies including nonpracticing entities will not have disclosed patents that they consider
essential.29 Finally, both studies only identified essential patents.
24. David J. Goodman & Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents, PROCEEDINGS
IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS NETWORKS, COMMUNICATIONS AND MOBILE
COMPUTING 2 (2005), available at http://eeweb.poly.edu/dgoodman/wirelesscom2005.pdf.
25. Companies generally have an incentive to over designate the number of essential patents and
patent applications they have. Failure to disclose a patent during the development of a standard can
result in fraud allegations if a company later asserts that patent against products that use the standard.
See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding two patents could not
be unenforced against those that practice a standard because a patent owner did not comply with the
patent policy of the standard-setting organization).
26. Goodman & Meyers, supra note 24, at 5.
27. Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through
Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 475–76 (2007).
28. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2027.
29. A good example of this is found in Commonwealth Scientific and Indus. Research Org. v.
Buffalo Tech. (USA), Inc., NO. 6:06-CV-324, 2006 WL 3317080 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2006), vacated in
part by Commonwealth Scientific and Indus. Research Org v. Buffalo Tech. (USA), Inc., 542 F.3d 1363
OF
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However, technology products inevitably incorporate non-essential
patented technology. For example, cell phone manufacturers may not
need to use any specific microprocessor, but they will have to use some
microprocessor, which involves using the corresponding patented
technology.
Regardless of which numbers are used, one can safely suggest that a
typical technology product probably uses over one hundred patents.
When Lemley and Shapiro‘s data is viewed in this light, even Golden
admits that ―it is sufficiently alarming to demand further
investigation.‖30 Yet, Elhauge and Sidak fail to explain how this data is
consistent with their theories of undercompensation. Indeed, Elhauge
does not discuss the empirical data at all. Sidak only summarizes the
results without attempting to explain them.31
Golden does identify some weaknesses in the empirical analysis. For
example, he correctly points out that the sample size of the empirical
study was small (as the authors themselves admit).32 Lemley and
Shapiro examined only forty-seven court reported decisions. Moreover,
Golden suggests that there was a sampling bias. Patents that are actually
involved in court reported decisions probably add more value to the
overall product than typical patents.33 However, these observations do
not adequately explain why reasonable royalty awards in component
patent cases should average 9.98% of the price of the total infringing
product.
Although patent holdup and royalty stacking may be one source of
overcompensation, this article focuses on another potential cause:
predictably irrational jury behavior.34 As further described in Part IV,
(Fed. Cir. 2008). CSIRO successfully argued that products that practiced the 802.11 standard infringed
their patent. Yet, there is no indication that they ever disclosed their patent to the standards committee.
Indeed, there is no reason for them to have done so given that they did not participate in the creation of
the standard. The Federal Circuit vacated part of the lower court decision on validity. On July 13,
2009, the parties announced that the settled the lawsuit.
30. Golden, supra note 13, at 2147.
31. Sidak, supra note 14, at 726–27.
32. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2030 (characterizing their data set as ―surprisingly
small.‖); Golden, supra note 13, at 2146.
33. Golden, supra note 13, at 2146 (―[P]atents that become the basis for court awarded damages
may be exceptionally likely to involve inventions to which an unusually high proportion of overall
profits might be attributed . . . .‖).
34. Patent holdup and royalty stacking actually predict that the negotiated reasonable royalty rate
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our current understanding of human behavior predicts that juries
overestimate the value a component patent provides to a multicomponent product. I then explain why applying contribution to patent
law can take advantage of other aspects of human behavior and cause
juries to arrive at lower royalty awards in component patent cases.
III. CURRENT APPROACHES
A number of mechanisms exist to address excessive reasonable
royalty awards in component patent cases. This Part discusses three of
those
mechanisms—permissive
apportionment,
mandatory
apportionment, and the entire market rule—and explains why they have
not successfully addressed overcompensation.
A. Permissive Apportionment and the Status Quo
The theory of apportionment is designed to prevent
overcompensation, especially in the area of component patents.35 Under
apportionment theory, the patent holder‘s remedy should be based on
the value the patented invention adds to the infringing product or
process.36 The theory attempts to isolate this value by preventing a
reasonable royalty analysis from capturing value attributable to two
other sources—the prior art and portions of the infringing product or
process that are not covered by the patented invention.37
The current system already permits juries to consider apportionment.
Under the Georgia-Pacific framework, jurors are instructed to consider
a hypothetical negotiation and ascertain the royalty upon which the
parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an
agreement just before infringement began.38 Juries are given fifteen
will be too high. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1994 (discussing threats and negotiated royalty
rates). However, Lemley and Shapiro‘s empirical data shows that the average royalty awarded in court
is excessive. Thus, Lemley and Shapiro‘s data actually corresponds more closely to this article‘s
discussion of jury behavior.
35. See Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein in the GeorgiaPacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2008).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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factors to consider when making this determination.39 Factor nine
discusses the utility of the patented invention over the prior art and
factor thirteen relates to the value of the invention as distinguished from
non-patented parts of the product. Thus, two of the fifteen GeorgiaPacific factors directly call out apportionment principles. Typical jury
instructions list all the Georgia-Pacific factors and inform juries that
they may consider each of these factors.40 This illustrates how the
current system employs what I refer to as ―permissible apportionment.‖
Nevertheless, the 9.98% average royalty rate reported by Lemley and
Shapiro shows that juries are not actually using apportionment concepts

39. Id. The factors are: (1) the royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in
suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty; (2) the rates paid by the licensee for the use of
other patents comparable to the patent in suit; (3) the nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or
non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold; (4) the licensor‘s established policy and marketing program to
maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under
special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly; (5) the commercial relationship between the
licensor and licensee, such as whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of
business; or whether they are inventor and promoter; (6) the effect of selling the patented specialty in
promoting sales of other products of the licensee, that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items, and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales; (7) the
duration of the patent and the term of the license; (8) the established profitability of the product made
under the patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity; (9). the utility and advantages of the
patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar result;;
(10) the nature of the patented invention, the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned
and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention to the extent to
which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use;
(12) the portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in
comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions; (13) the portion of
the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by
the infringer; (14) the opinion testimony of qualified experts; (15) the amount that a licensor (such as
the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement
began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount
which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture
and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a
royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added).
40. The Federal Circuit Bar Association Model Patent Jury Instructions, Instruction 6.7 lists the
Georgia-Pacific factors and says that the jury may consider them. FED. CIRCUIT BAR ASS‘N, MODEL
PATENT
JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
6.7
(2009),
available
at
http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9005/Library/purchase%20items/Jury%20Instr
uctions%20November%202009.pdf.
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in component cases. Thus, there is a disconnect between the law as
theorized and the law as practiced.41 This has led to various proposed
reforms that require apportionment.
B. Mandatory Apportionment and Legislative Gridlock
Led by some of its largest companies,42 the high tech industry has
lobbied Congress to adopt a form of ―mandatory apportionment.‖43
Indeed, some form of mandatory apportionment has appeared in at least
four different versions of patent reform legislation.44 The following
proposed language is representative of these proposals: ―The court shall
exclude from the analysis the economic value properly attributable to
the prior art, and other features or improvements, whether or not
themselves patented, that contribute economic value to the infringing
product or process.‖45
The pharmaceutical industry has opposed legislation containing
mandatory apportionment provisions.46 These objections take three
41. Part IV, infra, provides an explanation for the disconnect.
42. The Coalition for Patent Fairness‘ members include Apple, Autodesk, Business Software
Alliance, Cisco Systems, Dell, Google, HP, Information Technology Industry Council, Intel, Micron
Technology Inc., Microsoft, Oracle, Palm Inc., RIM, SAP, Symantec, and TechNet.
43. What
Needs
to
Change,
COALITION
FOR
PATENT
FAIRNESS,
http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/what (last visited Jan. 4, 2012) (―Congress should make clear that
when calculating damages, courts should focus on the invention‘s contribution to the value of the
infringing product, and not the value of the whole product or system that incorporates the invention.‖).
44. For example, Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007) (as
introduced in the Senate, Apr. 18, 2007), would require a judge to conduct a mandatory apportionment
analysis to ensure "that a reasonable royalty is applied only to that economic value properly attributable
to the patentee's specific contribution over the prior art." H.R 1908, the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (as
passed Sept. 7, 2007) contains this language as well. Under S. 1145 (as reported in Senate, Jan. 24,
2008), in the absence of an established royalty based on marketplace licensing, the reasonable royalty
inquiry must determine the economic value of the "claimed invention's specific contribution over the
prior art."
45. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007) (containing the language found in the bill when it was
introduced to the House of Representatives on April 18, 2007; however, the proposed language was
eliminated in later versions); see also S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007) (offering similar language).
46. Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. (PhRMA) Re: Evolving IP Marketplace—Comment,
Project No. P093900 18–21 (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/iphearings/54087200030.pdf [hereinafter PhRMA Comment] (comment by PhRMA to Federal Trade Commission); Patent
Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11–17 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson Statement] (detailing the prepared
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primary forms. First, the pharmaceutical industry complains that
apportionment will unreasonably decrease the value of patents and
undercompensate patent holders.47 Apportionment requires a dissection
of the claim elements. Since, at some level, all inventions can be
considered combinations of old elements, the pharmaceutical industry
argues that apportionment would inevitably result in ―grossly
undervaluing‖ inventions.48
Second, the pharmaceutical industry argues that apportionment would
complicate patent trials by requiring juries to compare a patent against
the prior art to determine the incremental value that the patent
contributes.49 Reviewing the state of the prior art at trial is very time
and resource-consuming. Former Chief Judge Michel of the Federal
Circuit agrees with this criticism. He says that apportionment would
result in a ―massive undertaking for which courts are ill-equipped.‖50
This criticism only applies to one part of apportionment theory:
preventing the jury from capturing value attributable to the prior art.
Because juries currently learn about the entire infringing process as part
of the evidence on infringement, asking them to exclude value
attributable to portions of the infringing product or process that are not
covered by the patented invention is not as time-consuming.
Finally, the pharmaceutical industry says that the current system of
permissive apportionment is sound because it gives courts the discretion
to consider apportionment when appropriate.51 There is some evidence
that courts are becoming more proactive in considering apportionment.
testimony of Philip S. Johnson, Chief Patent Counsel, Johnson & Johnson, on behalf of the Coalition for
21st Century Patent Reform).
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id. at 19 (―This proposed methodology is problematic, in part because at some level all
inventions can be considered combinations of old elements, albeit ones that are combined in a new way.
A forced dissection of a claimed invention into its individual parts would inevitably result in grossly
undervaluing the invention.‖); see also Johnson Statement, supra note 46, at 15.
49. Id. at 19–20.
50. Letter from Hon. Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge of the U.S. Appeals Court for the Federal
Circuit, to Sen. Patrick Leahy and Sen. Orrin Hatch 2 (May 3, 2007) [hereinafter Michel Letter],
available at http://www.patentsmatter.com/media/issue/legislation/20070503_Michel.pdf; see also
Chief Judge Paul Michel, Lecture: Innovation, Incentives, Competition, and Patent Law Reform: Should
Congress Fix the Patent Office and Leave Litigation Management to the Court, 20 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1135, 1162 (2010) [hereinafter Michel, Patent Law Reform].
51. See PhRMA Comment, supra note 46, at 20–21; see also Michel Letter, supra note 50.
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In Lucent Technologies v. Gateway, the Federal Circuit vacated a $350
million plus damages award against Microsoft.52 An important part of
that analysis focused on the fact that the infringing feature was ―but a
tiny feature of one part of much larger software program [Outlook].‖53
Former Chief Judge Michel has even cited to Lucent Technologies to
show that the Federal Circuit has ―pretty well solved‖ the problem of
excessive reasonable royalty awards.54 But vacating awards or granting
remittitur after trial is not an efficient solution. A truly effective reform
would prevent juries from issuing excessive awards in the first place.
In an attempt to resolve the stalemate between the technology and
pharmaceutical industries, recent versions of patent reform legislation
included the so-called ―gatekeeper compromise‖ that does not require
apportionment.55 Instead, the draft legislation would have forced judges
to act as gatekeepers to ensure that only those methodologies and factors
that are relevant to making the damages determination are used. The
relevant language provided that:
Sufficiency of Evidence—Prior to the introduction of any evidence
concerning the determination of damages, upon motion of either party or
sua sponte, the court shall consider whether one or more of a party‘s
damages contentions lacks a legally sufficient evidentiary basis. After
providing a nonmovant the opportunity to be heard, and after any further
proffer of evidence, briefing, or argument that the court may deem
appropriate, the court shall identify on the record those methodologies
and factors as to which there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis, and
the court or jury shall consider only those methodologies and factors in
making the determination of damages under this section. The court shall
only permit the introduction of evidence relating to the determination of
damages that is relevant to the methodologies and factors that the court
determines may be considered in making the damages determination.56

It is unclear how, or even if, the gatekeeper solution improves on the
52. Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Uniloc USA, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011), rehearing denied, No. 2010-1035, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7629 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2011) (affirming the district court‘s decision to grant a conditional
new trial on damages).
53. Lucent Tech., 580 F.2d at 1332.
54. Michel, Patent Law Reform, supra note 50, at 1153.
55. Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. § 4(b) (2011).
56. Id. at § 4(b)(3).
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existing mechanism used to exclude unreliable expert testimony.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 already requires judges to scrutinize
expert testimony to determine if ―the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and . . . [if] that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.‖57 Even this very modest compromise was recently was dropped,
and the latest version of patent reform says nothing about damages. 58
Thus, current efforts at requiring apportionment have failed, and the
latest Congressional efforts do not appear to meaningfully improve the
system.
C. Flaws With The Entire Market Rule
The entire market rule is yet another theory designed to prevent
excessive royalty awards in component patent cases. This rule provides
that a patentee can recover damages based on the entire market value of
the accused product only where the patented feature creates the ―basis
for customer demand‖ or ―substantially create[s] the value of the
component parts.‖59 Commentators have criticized the entire market
rule for both its underlying assumptions and its results. As Brian Love
and Mark Lemley observe, a single patent is almost never responsible
for the customer demand.60 Other features, including other patents, the
defendant‘s reputation, materials, and even marketing, contribute some
to customer demand.61 Love also points out that the courts have
interpreted the rule so broadly that patentees have been able to recover
damages for components that are unconnected to the infringing element
of the accused device.62 As a result, Love concludes that the entire
57. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–593 (1993). The Daubert decision
even uses the ―gatekeeper‖ language. Id. at 597.
58. America Invent Act, S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8, 2011).
59. Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
60. Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Rule, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 263, 278 (2007); Mark Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 655, 663 (2009).
61. Lemley, supra note 60, at 663.
62. Love, supra note 60, at 271 (citing Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367,
1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (allowing damages award for lost profits on sale of syrup used in patented
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market rule also contributes to overcompensation.63
Moreover, it is unclear if judges are willing to use the entire market
rule to exclude evidence, particularly when the patentees have no other
damages theory to offer. For example, in Cornell v. Hewlett Packard I,
Federal Circuit Judge Rader, sitting as a district court judge by
designation, initially excluded expert testimony on damages based on
the entire market rule.64 However, Judge Rader was reluctant to leave
Cornell without a damages theory and gave Cornell the opportunity to
return the next day of trial and offer different testimony. 65 Even though
the new testimony suffered from the same flaws, Judge Rader allowed
the testimony. 66 Eventually, he granted HP‘s motion for judgment as a
matter of law or, in the alternative, remittitur.67
Two other recent cases illustrate different ways that courts avoid the
harsh effect of the entire market rule. In Lucent Technologies, the
Federal Circuit did not prevent the patentee from seeking a royalty on
the entire product because there was simply no market value for the
infringing component.68 Thus, the plaintiff was allowed to ask for
damages based on the entire market value of Microsoft Outlook even
though the patented method clearly was not the basis for the demand for
the product.69 In another case involving Microsoft, the trial court
initially denied Microsoft‘s motion to exclude plaintiff‘s testimony

juice dispenser)); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (affirming damages award based on separate auxiliary equipment sold as part of a line of paperwinding products).
63. Love, supra note 60, at 272.
64. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett Packard Co. (Cornell I), No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 2222189, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008); see also Bernard Chao, Damages: The Courts Beat Congress to Patent
Reform
(Again),
LAW360
(Aug.
31,
2009),
available
at
http://chsblaw.com/downloads/The_Courts_Beat_Congress_To_Patent_Reform.pdf (discussing the
Cornell decisions).
65. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett Packard Co. (Cornell II), 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 at 284 (N.D.N.Y.
2009) (―Instead of leaving Cornell without proof of damages, this court instead offered Cornell an
opportunity to return the next day and offer testimony [on a different theory].‖).
66. Id. at 287 (―During the presentation of its damages case, Cornell did not heed this court's
warning that any royalty base proffer must account for the fact that the ′115 patent is a component of a
component of Hewlett–Packard's server and workstation products.‖).
67. Id. at 292.
68. Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
69. Id. at 1336–39.
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based on the entire market rule70 but later said that Microsoft was
entitled to a new trial because of the objectionable part of the plaintiff‘s
expert testimony.71 Thus, even if the entire market rule has some
intuitive appeal, at least some judges appear unwilling to categorically
exclude awarding a royalty on the whole product. Instead, these judges
use the rule to rein in an excessive award after trial. Of course, any
solution that relies on changing verdicts after trial is highly inefficient.
In sum, the current law includes both the entire market rule and
permissive apportionment. However, judges do not always require that
the patentee satisfy the entire market rule to obtain a royalty on the
whole product, and juries do not appear to be applying apportionment
principles. Moreover, empirical data confirms that these mechanisms
are insufficient. Efforts to adopt a form of mandatory apportionment
have also failed.
In Part IV, I propose a different theory of apportioning damages—the
theory of contribution, borrowed from tort law, which applies only when
there are multiple parties responsible for an infringing product.
Whereas the current system tolerates juries that ignore apportionment
principles, contribution can more firmly implant such notions into the
juries‘ minds. The theory also does not depend on the discretion of
judges. Moreover, since contribution will primarily apply to the
technology industry where different companies are frequently
responsible for the numerous components, contribution avoids the
technology-pharmaceutical stalemate that held up mandatory
apportionment. Even better, as I describe in Part V, the courts can adopt
contribution without an act of Congress.
IV. THE PROPOSAL: ADOPTING TORT LAW‘S THEORY OF CONTRIBUTION
This article recommends that patent law adopt tort law‘s theory of
contribution. The Restatement of the Law (Third) of Torts describes
contribution as follows:
70. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151 (D.R.I. 2009) (denying
Microsoft‘s motion to exclude Uniloc‘s testimony); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 640 F. Supp.
2d 150, 185 (D.R.I. 2009), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, and vacated in part by Uniloc USA, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
71. Id. at 185 (affirming the trial court‘s decision to grant a new trial on damages).
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When two or more persons are or may be liable for the same harm and
one of them discharges the liability of another by settlement or discharge
of judgment, the person discharging the liability is entitled to recover
contribution from the other, unless the other previously had a valid
settlement and release from the plaintiff.72

Contribution theory is well-suited to patent lawsuits involving multicomponent products because there are usually two or more parties
responsible for the same infringement. Consider a patent that covers a
new technique for displaying information on an LCD television. This
kind of technology is typically found in one of the television‘s
components, a graphics semiconductor chip. Both the LCD TV
manufacturer and the graphics chip supplier are potentially liable.73
Under current law, the patentee can sue either party. 74
If contribution were applied to patent law, manufacturers of multicomponent products accused of patent infringement would be able to
demand that any supplier of an infringing component share in any
potential liability. Under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a manufacturer would not have to wait until it lost a lawsuit
and was found liable for damages. It could implead its supplier and
force it to appear as a co-defendant.75 The parties‘ share of any liability
would be determined by their relative responsibilities.76
Adopting contribution in patent law provides two benefits. First,
contribution will lower the total royalties awarded in component patent

72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23(a) (1999).
73. Even though companies that supply components (e.g. semiconductor companies) are also
manufacturers, I refer to these companies as component suppliers to more clearly distinguish them from
the companies that make the end products (e.g. TVs), which I call multi-component product
manufacturers.
74. The LCD TV manufacturer would be liable under 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2010) for
direct infringement for selling a patented invention. Depending on whether the patent covered just a
chip of an entire television, the graphics chip supplier would probably be liable under § 271(a) for
making and selling a patented invention or for contributory infringement under § 271(c) for selling a
component that forms a material part of patented invention.
75. 6 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1448, at 453–54 (2010)
(―If the governing substantive law recognizes a right of contribution, impleader under Rule 14 is a
proper procedure which to seek relief from joint tortfeasors.‖).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23 cmt. e (1999) (―Proportionate shares. If a
person is otherwise entitled to contribution, the amount of contribution is determined by the percentage
responsibility the factfinder assigns to each person.‖).
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cases, an unexpected benefit unique to patent law. Second, as it does in
other areas of the law, contribution will provide a new set of default
rules that equitably spreads liability among responsible parties.
A. Anchoring Problems with Multi-Component Products
The current literature fails to explain why juries do not apply
permissive apportionment principles, even though defendants
undoubtedly ask for apportionment at trial and jury instructions discuss
apportionment principles. This article looks to behavioral economics
theory to offer an explanation.77 Specifically, subpart A suggests that
patentees frame the issue by choosing to sue the manufacturer of the
multi-component product instead of the component supplier. Thus, the
patentee‘s initial demand points to the sales price of the multicomponent product and uses that as the royalty base (as opposed to the
sales price of the component itself). This demand serves to anchor the
jury‘s royalty calculation in a manner that does not reflect
apportionment principles. Subpart B then explains how contribution
theory would reframe the calculation around the price of the component
and thereby lower jury awards.
Consider the example of a patent that covers a new technique for
displaying information on a LCD television.
The graphics
semiconductor chip that contains this technology is just one component
of an LCD TV. In our example, the LCD TV sales price is $1,000 and
the graphics chip is $30.78 Typically, patentees will sue the multicomponent product manufacturer because patentees believe that they
can obtain a larger award based on the higher selling price of the LCD
TV.
Ideally, this tactic should not be successful. After all, the value added
by the patented technology is the same regardless of whether the
patentee sues the chip supplier or the LCD TV manufacturer.
77. Of course one explanation for the failure of permissive apportionment is that the
apportionment factors may get lost when considering the all fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors. However,
this explanation is not sufficient. Not all fifteen factors are applicable in every case and defendants‘
attorneys will surely highlight the apportionment factors when they apply.
78. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2010), which governs direct infringement, treats both parties the
same since they both make and sell products that contain the patented technology.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/3

22

Chao: THE CASE FOR CONTRIBUTION IN PATENT LAW

2011]

THE CASE FOR CONTRIBUTION IN PATENT LAW

135

Presumably, the royalty rate, as a percentage, should be smaller if the
patentee chooses to sue the LCD TV manufacturer. Under the current
system of permissive apportionment, attorneys representing the LCD
TV manufacturer will point out that the patented invention is only small
part of a much larger product. Moreover, these arguments will be
buttressed by instructions from the judge that incorporate the thirteenth
Georgia-Pacific factor. Nonetheless, Lemley and Shapiro‘s data
suggests that juries have been awarding royalties that average 9.98% of
the cost of the entire product in these situations, or approximately a
$100 royalty on each $1,000 LCD TV.
The concepts of anchoring and arbitrariness can help explain this
result. Anchoring generally refers to the observation that an initial
arbitrary or irrelevant number inordinately influences an individual‘s
numerical determinations.79
For example, Dan Ariely, George
Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec conducted a study asking the
participants to write down the last two digits of their social security
numbers.80 The participants were then asked what they would pay for
various common items including chocolates, wine, a cordless trackball,
and a cordless keyboard. Remarkably, the results showed that the last
two digits of the participants‘ social security numbers actually served as
an anchor for the price they were willing to pay. In other words, the
participants with the highest-ending social security numbers (80-99)
were willing to pay the most, and those with the lowest-ending social
security numbers (1-20) were willing to pay the least. This example
shows how arbitrary an individual‘s valuation can be.
There is every reason to expect that juries in patent cases are affected
by anchors.81
First, anchoring effects have previously been
demonstrated in the context of both personal injury82 and punitive
79. REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 71–72 (2d ed. 2010).
80. Dan Ariely, George Lowenstein & Drazen Prelec, ―Coherent Arbitrariness”: Stable Demand
Curves without Stable Preferences, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 73, 75–77 (2003).
81. EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JURY AWARDS 149–173 (2003) (summarizing the academic literature on the effect of anchoring on
juries).
82. Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You Get:
Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 519 (1996). The title of
Chapman and Bornstein‘s study aptly explains its finding.
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damages cases.83 For example, several studies have shown that a
plaintiff‘s award request can have a dramatic effect on the actual award;
all other factors being the same, the higher the request, the higher the
award.84 Moreover, people are particularly susceptible to anchoring
effects in areas where they lack context.85 The calculation of a
reasonable royalty for a patented invention is a perfect example of an
area where juries have no frame of reference.86 Very few people have
experience with this calculation, and if they did, they probably would
not be allowed on a patent jury.
In the example of the LCD TV, the patentee (as the plaintiff) would
offer its damages case first. The patentee‘s attorneys would ask the jury
to calculate damages using the $1,000 LCD TV as the royalty base. If
the patentee asks for 13% royalty (approximately the average royalty
Lemley and Shapiro found for all patent cases), the demand would be
$13,000,000 assuming that 100,000 LCD TVs were sold. This demand
would serve as the anchor for the jury. Although the jury may depart
from that anchor based on other information, studies suggest that the
jury will likely ―underadjust.‖87
This problem is often exacerbated by the tactics defendants use at
trial. In general, liability and damages are tried together before the same
jury.88 A defendant who is contesting liability and also arguing damages
83. Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff's Requests and
Plaintiff's Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 445, 463 (1999).
84. Id. at 463 (summarizing several studies).
85. Karen Jacowitz & Daniel Kahneman, Measures of Anchoring in Estimation Tasks, 21
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1161, 1161–1166 (1995) (finding that anchoring effects were
inversely related to a subject‘s confident in their judgments, but substantial even in judgments made
with high confidence).
86. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 593 (2005)
(finding that in the context of tort law, ―Juries lack reference points, so their judgments will depend
heavily on the presentation of evidence by lawyers, and on whatever anchors, prejudices, and
expectations citizens bring to the jury box.‖). Patent juries probably have even less context than the
juries in the tort cases the authors were discussing.
87. HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 79, at 72 (―What happens is that people adjust their estimates
from this anchor but nevertheless remain too close to it. When we sequentially integrate information in
this manner, we usually ‗underadjust.‘‖).
88. PETER S. MENELL, LYNN H. PASAHOW, JAMES POOLEY & MATTHEW D. POWERS, PATENT
CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE, BIFURCATING DAMAGES § 8.1.1.3 (2009) (noting that while
courts may bifurcate damages from liability, in practice most courts decline to do so). In 2011,
Congress considered and then dropped legislation that would require courts to sequence patent trials so
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is conveying a mixed message. The defendant is telling the jurors that it
is not liable, while at the same time advising jurors on what the damages
award should be. Defendants fear that presenting a damages case will
be interpreted as an admission of liability. At least one study has shown
that there is a reasonable basis for this fear. This study found that when
defendants offer an alternative damages theory, the likelihood of a
liability finding increases.89 There is also anecdotal evidence that
defendants often do not offer an alternative damages award to serve as a
―counter anchor.‖90 This is true even though counter anchors can be
effective.91 The result is that the only anchor juries often see is the
award a patentee requests.
In sum, behavioral economics can explain why the current system of
permissive apportionment does not serve to limit reasonable royalty
calculations to the value a patented invention adds to an infringing
product or process. Patentees are able to place anchors that frame
juries‘ determinations in terms of the value of a multi-component
product instead of the value of the component itself. Consequently,
royalties for component patents look like the awards we would expect
for patents that cover the entire multi-component product and not just
the component itself. This description of jury behavior is fully
consistent with the 9.98% average royalty rate that Lemley and Shapiro
reported for component patents. Fortunately, the theory of contribution
that the damages phase will occur after liability unless the court found good cause to do otherwise. See
S. 515, 111th Cong. (2010).
89. Leslie A. Ellis, Don‘t Find My Client Liable . . . but If You Do: Defense Recommendations,
Liability Verdicts, and General Damage Awards (2002) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
Illinois, Chicago) (on file with author) (―Compared to jurors who did not hear a defense
recommendation, jurors who heard a defense award recommendation were more likely to find for the
plaintiff on liability, but only when the evidence strongly favored the defendant.‖). Based on my own
communications with the author (now a jury consultant), she now believes that the limitation on her
findings was an artifact of the particular fact pattern used in the study.
90. Hastie et al., supra note 83, at 466 (―In real trials, as in the cases on which we based our
experimental materials, it is common for only the plaintiff to provide salient anchor values, with the
defendant denying liability and arguing for the much less salient (especially when a jury concludes that
liability is warranted) value of zero.‖) (emphasis added).
91. Allan Raitz, Edith Greene, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Determining Damages:
The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 385,
385–395 (1990) (finding that ―Jurors exposed to conflicting expert testimony (i.e., by plaintiff and
defense experts) will view the amounts suggested as constituting a range and compute a figure that falls
near the middle of the range.‖).
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can ameliorate anchoring effects.
B. Contribution and Coherence
By allowing multi-component manufacturers to ask for contribution
and implead component suppliers, the law can fundamentally change the
way juries think about damages issues. Although patentees can still
frame the issue by choosing to sue the manufacturer of the multicomponent product, the theory of contribution would force juries to
make a new calculation: they would have to determine the damages
owed by the component supplier. Relying on another behavioral
economics concept, ―coherence,‖ this article argues that juries would
align the award against the component supplier with the price of the
component. At a minimum, a jury would find that the liability of the
component supplier was lower than the sales price of the component.
The jury may even calculate damages using the component‘s sales as a
royalty base, as opposed to larger sales of the multi-component product.
In either case, contribution should result in substantially lower
reasonable royalty awards for component patents than currently
observed.
Although people are susceptible to anchors when making valuations,
studies have shown that people‘s relative valuations appear orderly.92 In
other words, their valuations are ―coherent.‖93 Ariely, Loewenstein, and
Prelec‘s study on the anchoring effects of social security numbers
illustrates this concept as well. Even though the prices the participants
selected appeared arbitrary (the last two digits of their social security
numbers served to anchor their estimates), participants consistently
valued a cordless keyboard higher than a cordless trackball and a rare
wine higher than an average wine.94 This observation suggests that
juries will behave differently if they are making valuations required by
contribution.
92. Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, supra note 80, at 76–77 (―Subjects, it seems, did not know
how much they valued these items, but they did know the relative ordering within the categories of wine
and computer accessories.‖).
93. Id. at 74.
94. Id. at 76. Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec have called the combination anchoring effects and
coherence ―coherent arbitrariness.‖
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If patent juries‘ determinations also exhibit coherence, allowing
contribution should result in substantially lower reasonable royalty
awards. Returning to our hypothetical, consider the jury‘s new task
under the theory of contribution. The multi-component manufacturer
can implead the component supplier and ask for contribution. The jury
would be asked to determine not only the reasonable royalty award
owed to the patentee but also the shares that both the LCD TV
manufacturer and the chip supplier must pay.
The 10% royalty rate on the entire LCD TV was coherent when
viewed against the backdrop of a simple lawsuit against the LCD TV
manufacturer. Juries should intuitively understand that a royalty should
be lower than the price of the product. Since the $100 royalty that we
previously hypothesized is substantially lower than the $1,000 sales
price of the LCD TV, the result is coherent. However, what was
previously a coherent result becomes incoherent when the jury is asked
to calculate what the chip supplier owes.
If the jury applies a 10% royalty on the LCD TV and finds that both
the LCD TV manufacturer and chip supplier were equally at fault, each
party would be responsible for half the award—a 5% royalty.95 This
would result in the patentee collecting $100 per unit with each defendant
being liable for $50 per unit. However, the sales price of the chip was
only $30. The $100 award and the $30 chip sales price suggest an
incoherent result. In other words, the chip supplier would be paying
more than it received for the entire chip. To obtain some form of basic
coherence, the damages award against the chip supplier would have to
be less than the sales price of the chip. The award would have to be less
than $60 per unit with each defendant owing less than $30 per unit.
For an award to be truly coherent, the jury would have to make sure
that the chip supplier paid some meaningful amount less than the sales
price of the chip.96 One reasonable way to obtain this result would be to

95. For the purposes of this hypothetical, I assume that juries will find that component suppliers
and the multi-component manufacturers are each 50% responsible. However as discussed later, the
parties will undoubtedly fashion arguments that will lay greater responsibility at each other‘s feet. See
infra note 156 and accompanying text.
96. See Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement
Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909, 921 (2009) (arguing that reasonable royalties should be less than the
―expected profits‖ of an infringer).
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calculate damages using the chip‘s sales as a royalty base. Under that
scenario, if the jury awarded a 10% royalty based on the price of the
chip, the LCD TV manufacturer and chip supplier each would be liable
only for $3.00 per unit royalty or $1.50 per unit. Even if a 20% royalty
were used, the defendants would owe only $3.00 per unit each, or
$600,000 for both defendants. This is substantially lower than the
amount $13,000,000 for one defendant suggested by our analysis
without contribution.97
Like apportionment, contribution should lower reasonable royalty
awards for component patent cases. However, contribution uses a
fundamentally different mechanism than apportionment. It does not
simply ―allow‖ juries to consider apportionment principles like the
current system of permissive apportionment, nor does it attempt to force
courts to apply apportionment as suggested by mandatory apportionment
proposals. Rather, contribution takes advantage of our natural tendency
to make coherent valuations. By requiring the jury to determine the
component supplier‘s liability, contribution places an important
reference point prominently before the jury, namely the price of the
component. Thus, contribution elevates the significance of the
component price in a way that permissive apportionment does not.
Once juries appreciate that information, they will likely use it to frame
their determination. The result in component patent cases should be
lower awards that are actually based on the value of the component
instead of the larger multi-component product.
C. Contribution and Fairness
Contribution also provides a second independent benefit, which is the
same benefit it provides in so many other areas of the law: preventing
the disparate treatment of similarly situated parties. For example, most
states have recognized some form of contribution among joint
tortfeasors.98 Congress has explicitly provided for contribution in a
97. This author does not mean to suggest that the numbers used in this article accurately reflect
the real world effect of contribution theory. However, this thought experiment does suggest that
contribution theory will meaningfully reduce royalty awards for component patents. The actual amount
is still to be determined.
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23 cmt. a (1999).
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number of federal contexts like CERCLA actions,99 some types of
securities cases,100 and tax actions.101 The federal courts have also
recognized the right of contribution in the context of admiralty law and
private rights of action under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934.102 Even when the Supreme Court said it did not have the
authority to adopt contribution theory in the context of antitrust law,103 a
congressionally-created commission later recommended adopting
contribution by statute.104
In the context of patent law, contribution will spread liability among
the different parties responsible for infringement. A manufacturer
should not bear the full financial responsibility for infringement when
the heart of the invention is found in a component that the manufacturer
purchases and incorporates into its product. To the extent that infringers
are culpable, that culpability often lies just as much with component
suppliers.
Take the case of Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics.105 Quanta
made personal computers by adding memory and buses to Intel
microprocessors and chipsets.106 Quanta followed Intel's specifications
to incorporate the parts needed to build personal computers and did not
modify the Intel components.107 Yet, Quanta was sued for patent
infringement based on patents that ostensibly covered the operation of
the Intel parts.108 Intel should bear some responsibility for infringement
when Intel‘s components were the focus of the claims. Indeed, Intel and
the patentee (LG Electronics) both appeared to recognize this when they

99. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2006).
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78u-4(f)(4)(C) (West 2010). Subsection 4(f)(4)(C) announces the
applicability of contribution, while 4(f)(5) outlines the types of parties that can be reached through the
theory.
101. 26 U.S.C. § 6672(d) (2006).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 133–34, 140–43 for a discussion of the Court‘s authority
to recognize a right of contribution in these contexts.
103. See infra text accompanying note 138.
104. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2007),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm.
105. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621–24 (2008).
106. Id. at 624.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 621–23.
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entered into an earlier license agreement.109
The facts in HTC v. Technology Properties110 also illustrate why
patentees should not be able to focus solely on the end-product
manufacturer. In HTC, the defendant argued that it did not understand
the internal operation of the components it bought.111 Over the
plaintiff‘s objections, the court allowed the defendant to show its
supplier the patentee‘s infringement contentions.
To the extent that any party is culpable, it is the party that knowingly
caused the accused technology to be included in the product. Thus, even
if contribution does not change jury behavior in the manner discussed
above, fairness provides an independent justification for adopting
contribution in patent law.
Critics will undoubtedly argue that contribution is not needed in
patent law because of the existence of indemnification agreements. The
possibility of an indemnification agreement distinguishes patent law
from many other areas of the law that have adopted contribution. For
example, in tort law two individuals responsible for a single car accident
often have no relationship. Thus, the parties could not have negotiated
an earlier indemnification agreement. Conversely, in patent law those
seeking contribution will typically have a commercial relationship.112
Therefore, one could argue that the efficient solution is to allow parties
to use indemnification agreements to determine the relative risk each
party bears.113
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that contribution does
not prevent contracting parties from negotiating an indemnification
agreement that would govern later patent infringement actions.
109. Id. at 623.
110. See HTC Corp. v. Tech. Properties Ltd., No. C08-00882, 2009 WL 1392513 (N.D. Cal. May
14, 2009).
111. Id. at *1.
112. This is not always the case because certain components pass through intermediate companies
that simply incorporate the original component in larger component.
113. Indemnification provisions can arise out of an express agreement or they can be implied.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides for a default implied warranty against infringement that
applies to the sale of goods. ―Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in
goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person
by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must hold the
seller harmless against any such claim which arises out of compliance with the specifications.‖ U.C.C.
§ 2-312(2) (2001) (emphasis added).
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According to the Restatement of the Law (Third) of Torts, when
indemnification is provided, contribution does not apply. 114
Nonetheless, contribution is still significant because it provides a
different set of default rules. Under the current system, the patentee
selects the defendant and thereby chooses which joint tortfeasor is liable
for the infringement. As described earlier, the patentee typically selects
the multi-component product manufacturer to maximize its potential
damages recovery. Of course the product manufacturer and its supplier
could have negotiated an indemnification agreement. But if they did not
do so, the patentee‘s selection identifies the party that is liable. In other
words, under the current default rule the patentee gets to choose who is
liable. In contrast, if contribution were adopted, the patentee‘s selection
would not have the same effect. Parties that jointly caused infringement
would share damages liability based on their relative responsibility.
Again, the manufacturer and its supplier could contract out of these
default rules through an indemnification agreement. However, as
explained below, this may be a mistake on behalf of both parties.
Although indemnification agreements often equitably spread liability
among different parties, they do not obviate the need for contribution in
patent law for three reasons. First, indemnification agreements will not
serve to lower total royalty awards in patent cases. Typically, when a
product manufacturer has a right of indemnification, it does not implead
the component supplier providing indemnification. So long as there is
no dispute over the terms of indemnification, the component supplier
simply operates behind the scenes. The component supplier may control
the defense and pay any eventual award, but it does not actually appear
in the lawsuit. A jury will not have to consider the component supplier
and the price of the component in the same way it would if contribution
were at issue. In other words, indemnification does not serve to reframe
the jury‘s royalty calculation in the way that contribution will. In
contrast, by lowering the total damages award, contribution should
benefit both the multi-component product manufacturer seeking
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23(c) (1999) (―A person who has a right of
indemnity against another person under § 22 does not have a right of contribution against that person
and is not subject to liability for contribution to that person.‖). However, the Restatement goes on to
note that ―[a] person may seek both indemnity and contribution as alternative theories of recovery . . . .‖
Id. at § 23 cmt. d.
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contribution and the component supplier that is compelled to provide
contribution. Thus, it may be in both parties‘ interest not to enter into an
indemnification agreement and to allow contribution to govern their
relationship.
Second, indemnification only exists when there is privity between the
parties. Such privity does not always exist. For example, if a computer
manufacturer is sued for the way a chip in its disk drive operates, the
manufacturer may wish to seek contribution from both the disk drive
supplier and the disk drive‘s supplier who provided the controller chip.
Since the computer manufacturer did not contract with the controller
chip supplier, it is unlikely to have an indemnification agreement with
the supplier.
Third, indemnification agreements are often an ineffective way of
shifting the liability because the existence of indemnification often turns
upon the relative bargaining power of the parties and not their relative
responsibility for the end product. The facts of Quanta Computer v. LG
Electronics illustrate how a component supplier with a strong bargaining
position can refuse to provide terms that protect its customers from
liability caused by the supplier‘s component.115 Intel is the dominant
supplier of microprocessors for personal computers.116 Intel took a
license to LG Electronics‘ patent portfolio. The agreement permitted
Intel to ―make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer to sell, import, or
otherwise dispose of‖ Intel microprocessors and chipsets that practiced
the LG Electronics patents; however, the agreement granted no license
to Intel‘s customers to use its products in combination with other
components.117 Intel sold its microprocessors and chipsets to a number
of computer manufacturers including Quanta. The manufacturers
combined Intel‘s products with other basic components (e.g.,memory
and buses) to make their computers. Since the LG Electronics-Intel
license did not cover Intel‘s customers, LG Electronics sued a number of
these computer manufacturers (including Quanta Computer) for patent
infringement.
115. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621–24 (2008).
116. See FTC, Intel Corp.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 74 Fed.
Reg. 153, 48338–48346 (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/index.shtm.
(concerning FTC‘s investigation of Intel).
117. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 623.
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Although the Quanta Computer decision does not explicitly discuss
indemnification, it is clear that Intel‘s customer agreements did not
provide indemnification. In fact, Intel did the opposite by informing its
customers that they could be liable for using Intel‘s products in
combination with other components, even though Intel had a license
covering those microprocessors and chipsets,118 despite there being no
other use for the Intel products.119 In the end, the Supreme Court found
that the computer manufacturers were not liable because LG
Electronics‘ patent rights had been exhausted when Intel first sold LG‘s
products under a valid license.120 Nonetheless, the facts of Quanta
Computer illustrate how naive it would be to expect companies with
market power like Intel to offer indemnification provisions simply
because the components they supply may be responsible for patent
infringement.121
Of course, contribution does not bar companies with market power
from reallocating the risk of infringement by agreement, but by
changing the default assignment of liability, contribution makes the
negotiation far more difficult for the supplier. Under the current
landscape, a supplier with market power can simply refuse to indemnify
its customer. Essentially, the supplier is saying, ―When you buy my
component, I will not indemnify you for your infringement even though
I played a role in it.‖ However, if contribution were adopted, the
supplier would actually have to demand that its customer indemnify the
supplier. In other words, the supplier would have to say, ―When you
buy my component, you need to indemnify me for my infringement.‖
Presumably, this different dynamic will make it more difficult for even
dominant suppliers to avoid liability for infringement they cause. In
sum, the possibility of indemnification agreements does not eliminate
the need for contribution in patent law.

118. A separate Master Agreement with LG Electronics required Intel to notify its customers that
Intel has a license to the LG Electronic patents, but that customers did not have a license. Id. at 623–24.
119. Id. at 632 (―LGE has suggested no reasonable use for the Intel Products other than
incorporating them into computer systems that practice the LGE patents.‖).
120. Id. at 638.
121. But see F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking
Contracting Options off the Table, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315 (arguing that parties should have the
freedom to make what appear to be unfair deals).
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V. REFORM FROM THE COURTS
A. Conflating Contribution with Contributory Infringement
So far district courts have uniformly rejected applying contribution in
patent cases because of an unfortunate misunderstanding. In Motorola
v. Varo,122 the Northern District of Texas first addressed whether a
defendant in a patent action ―may have a claim for contribution from
[the third party defendants] as joint tortfeasors.‖123 The court sought to
determine whether such an action could be implied from the patent laws
or as a part of federal common law. The decision dismissed both
possibilities because of the doctrine of contributory infringement set
forth in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). The court reasoned that ―Congress, having
defined contributory infringement by statute, could not have intended
the courts to imply some other definition and allow a cause of action
upon it.‖124 In other words, the Motorola court viewed the theory of
contribution and patent law‘s contributory infringement as variations of
the same theory. The few district courts that have addressed the issue
since Motorola have followed both its analysis and holding.125
Although the two doctrines share a common root word, contributory
liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) is a distinct doctrine from tort law‘s
theory of contribution. Contributory liability in patent law can be
thought of as a type of accessory liability. 126 Under patent law, direct
infringers are those that make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import the entire
122. Motorola, Inc. v. Varo, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 716, 717–718 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
123. Id. at 717.
124. Id. at 718.
125. See Chemtron, Inc. v. Aqua Prods., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 314, 316 (E.D. Va. 1993) (―There is
no claim for contribution under the U.S. patent laws, and none may arise under state law as it is
preempted by federal law.‖); see also Constr. Tech., Inc., v. Lockformer Co., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 195,
201 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (―[T]he Court agrees with [Motorola] that there is no right of contribution in patent
cases.‖); see also McNeilab, Inc. v. Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-7403, 1993 WL 212424 (E.D. Pa.
June 16, 1993) (quoting both Motorola and Construction Technology for the proposition that the
existence of a statute regarding contributory infringement forecloses the application of contribution in
patent law).
126. See Bernard Chao, Breaking Aro’s Commandment: Recognizing that Inventions have Heart,
20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1183, 1194 (2010) (―Contributory infringement
assumes that a party did not make, use, or sell the entire patented invention. Nonetheless, the statute
imposes liability for a party that contributes to another‘s act of direct infringement.‖).
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patented invention.127 However, even when a party is not a direct
infringer, it can be found indirectly liable for aiding and abetting others
to directly infringe. Contributory infringement and inducement are the
two types of aid that lead to indirect liability. 128 Just as tort law‘s
accessory liability requires another party‘s tortious behavior, both
theories are predicated on finding that another party is directly
infringing a patent.129 The specific statutory language governing
contributory infringement states:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in
an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.130

Under this statute, parties that do not make or sell an entire patented
invention may be liable for contributory infringement if they provide a
material part of the patented invention. Thus, the theory of contributory
infringement helps establish which parties are liable for patent
infringement and which are not.
In contrast, tort law‘s theory of contribution says nothing about who
is liable. The theory assumes the law has already identified the
responsible parties. Once the liable or potentially liable parties of
interest are identified, contribution provides a mechanism to apportion
any damages between those parties. To date, district courts have failed
to appreciate this distinction, and their decisions rely on improperly
conflating the two doctrines.
B. Federal Court Authority
Although the district courts have analyzed the law incorrectly, this

127.
128.
129.
130.

35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2010).
Id. at §§ 271(b), (c) (describing inducement and contributory infringement respectively).
C. R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
35 U.S.C.A. § 271(c) (West 2010).
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does not mean that the courts are empowered to adopt contribution in
patent law. Determining whether the courts have the authority to
recognize a new remedy in the context of federal law is a complex
question. The Supreme Court has said that the courts do not have the
power to adopt contribution in antitrust law,131 the Equal Pay Act, or
Title VII.132 However, the Court has said that they do have the power in
admiralty law133 and under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Act.134 To explain the differing outcomes, the Supreme Court has
identified three relevant categories of federal law.
In certain areas of law, ―the federal courts have had historic, wellrecognized responsibility for the elaboration of legal doctrine.‖135 Thus,
in Coopers Stevedoring v. Fritz Kopke, the Supreme Court found that
the courts had the authority to adopt contribution in admiralty law. 136
In other areas of law, such as antitrust law, Equal Pay, and Title VII,
the law is ―defined by statutory provisions that were express in creating
the substantive damages liability for which contribution was sought.‖ 137
In these areas, the Supreme Court asked whether Congress ―expressly or
by clear implication‖ envisioned a contribution right to accompany the
substantive damages right created.138 If there was no such implication,
the Court then asked whether Congress ―intended courts to have the
power to alter or supplement the remedies enacted.‖139 In Texas
Industries v. Radcliff Materials, the Supreme Court answered those
questions in the negative and found that the courts are not empowered to
adopt contribution in antitrust law.140 The Court used the same analysis
to arrive at the same result with respect to the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers.141
131. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
132. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 86–87 (1981).
133. Coopers Stevedoring Co. Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
134. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp‘rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
135. Id. at 290.
136. Coopers Stevedoring, 417 U.S at 111–115.
137. Musick, 508 U.S. at 291.
138. Id. (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981)).
139. Id. (citing Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 645 and Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of
Am., 451 U.S. 77, 91, 97 (1981)).
140. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981).
141. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) (―But the
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Finally, the Supreme Court identified a third category of federal law
in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wassau.142 Even
though a statutory scheme (the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934)
governed securities law, the decision focused on what role the courts
have had in fashioning the specific remedy. The private right of action
under 10b-5 was implied by the judiciary on the theory ―that courts
should recognize private remedies to supplement federal statutory
duties, not on the theory Congress had given an unequivocal direction to
the court to so.‖143 Thus, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there
was no reason to ask what Congress intended or implied with regard to
contribution. The question of contribution was ancillary to the private
cause of action courts had already provided. Having established that the
courts‘ role was ―to continue elaboration of the scope of the 10b-5
right,‖144 the Supreme Court went on to find a right of contribution in
10-b5 actions.145
Thus, there appears to be three possible avenues for adopting
contribution in a particular substantive area of federal law: (1) showing
that the courts have historically elaborated a general common law for
that particular subject area; (2) finding a statute that implies
contribution; and (3) showing that contribution is ancillary to those
portions of the law that the courts have already developed.146
District courts have already found that parties suing under the patent
statutes cannot take advantage of the second theory because the statutes
do not imply an action for contribution.147 Although those findings are
correct insofar as they go, those courts overlooked the other sources of
possible judicial authority. Namely, they have failed to consider the
authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to
provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt.‖).
142. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp‘rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 291 (1993). In 1995,
Congress enacted a statute that explicitly recognized the right of contribution. See supra note 100.
143. Musick, 508 U.S. at 291 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 292.
145. Id. at 298.
146. There is also an argument that whether contribution applies to federal law is actually
governed by state law. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER AND DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WESCHLER‘S, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 714 (6th ed. 2009). Of
course this would lead to the risk of inconsistent results and choice of law issues.
147. See Hricik, supra note 1 (stating that the patent statutes do not imply a right to contribution).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

37

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3

150

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

third category outlined above—whether the theory of contribution is
ancillary to an area of patent law that has previously been developed by
the courts. Had they looked at that issue, they would have realized that
joint and several liability in patent law can serve as the basis for courts‘
authority.
As early as 1884, in Birdsell v. Shaliol, the Supreme Court labeled
different infringers as joint tortfeasors.148 Soon thereafter, courts
compared patent infringers to trespassers and held that they were jointly
and severally liable.149 These decisions are not simply historical
artifacts. In 2001, the Federal Circuit classified the importers and
resellers of an infringing device as joint tortfeasors and found that they
were jointly and severally liable.150 Similarly, in the case of an
infringing multi-component product, a patentee may receive a full
satisfaction from either the multi-component product manufacturer or
component supplier.151 Moreover, there are no patent statutes that
discuss whether infringers are jointly and severally liable.
The right to contribution flows directly from the issue of joint and
several liability. Contribution says that when two or more persons are
jointly and severally liable for the same injury and one of them has paid
more than his fair share of the common liability, that party may recover
contribution from the other responsible parties. Since the federal courts
have established that infringers are jointly and severally liable through
patent common law, under the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Musick,
Peeler, the courts also have the power to adopt the ancillary remedy of
contribution.
Consequently, contribution can sidestep the obstacles that prevented
148. Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485, 489 (1884) (finding an earlier judgment against one
infringer without a full satisfaction did not bar a second suit against the second infringer).
149. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897) (―From the
earliest times, all who take part in a trespass, either by actual participation therein or by aiding and
abetting it, have been held to be jointly and severally liable for the injury inflicted.‖); Dowagiac Mfg.
Co. v. Deere & Webber Co., 284 F. 331, 337 (8th Cir. 1922) (classifying the seller and manufacturer of
infringing grain drills as joint tort-feasors and saying that they were jointly and severally liable);
Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Searchlight Horn Co., 225 F. 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1915) (―There may be as many
causes of action as there are joint tort-feasors, and as many recoveries, but there can only be one
satisfaction.‖).
150. Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Semiconductor Energy Lab.
Co. Ltd. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal 2007).
151. Shockley, 248 F.3d at 1364.
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mandatory apportionment from ever being adopted. Contribution does
not need Congressional approval; the courts can implement it now.
What‘s more, contribution will primarily apply to the technology
industry, in which different companies are frequently responsible for the
numerous components that go into modern-day computers and
electronics. Contribution will not apply to the pharmaceutical industry
because usually only one party is responsible for a drug. Thus, the
contribution solution navigates around the political realities of the
technology-pharmaceutical stalemate and Congressional inertia to offer
substantive damages reform targeted at a specific industry that has
suffered from overinflated damage awards.
C. Application of Contribution In Patent Law
Of course, patent law is quite different than tort law, and the
application of contribution to patent law will need to take into account
these differences. Contribution arises when two or more persons are
responsible for the same harm. Thus, it is important to define what the
same harm is. In patent law the harm is infringement.
Fortunately, two existing patent doctrines can help determine when
parties are responsible for the same infringement: indirect infringement
under §§ 271(b) and (c) and the first sale or exhaustion doctrine. As
discussed earlier, §§ 271(b) and (c) define two types of indirect
infringement: inducement and contributory infringement. The statute
places liability on those who either direct others to infringe
(inducement) or help them infringe by supplying parts that are especially
suited to infringe (contributory infringement). Both types of indirect
infringement require that another party directly infringe upon a patent.
It follows that an indirect infringer and its corresponding direct infringer
cause the same infringement (i.e., harm). For the purposes of
contribution theory, that means (1) a semiconductor component supplier
that contributes to the infringement of a downstream computer
manufacturer and (2) the manufacturer itself cause the same harm.
Consequently, these two parties would have the right of contribution
against one another.
In some cases, the component supplier will not be a contributory
infringer, but a direct infringer. In that case, the theory of exhaustion
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can help us determine when two parties are responsible for the same
harm. Patent exhaustion limits the patent rights that survive the initial
authorized sale of a patented item.152 In our recurring hypothetical, once
a patentee recovers from a component supplier, it would be unable to
obtain a second recovery from the downstream multi-component
product manufacturer because it had exhausted its rights. One can think
of exhaustion as prohibiting two recoveries for the same harm. Thus, if
exhaustion would apply to the sale of a component and protect the
downstream manufacturer, there should also be a right of contribution
between those two parties.
VI. NEXT STEPS
This article outlines the case for contribution in patent law, but it is
only the first step in a much larger conversation. First, I acknowledge
that I am only theorizing about the impact of contribution on juries.
Further study needs to be done on actual jury behavior. Moreover, by
changing the patent landscape in such a fundamental way, contribution
will create ripple effects in other patent doctrines as well as the way
companies behave. In this Part of the article, I attempt to identify, but
not resolve, some of these issues.
A.

Future Studies

I have only theorized why overcompensation occurs in component
patent cases. Although well-established concepts from behavioral
economics support this theory, it is not certain that those concepts
translate to the patent damages context. Some studies relating to
punitive damages and non-economic injuries in tort cases demonstrate
anchoring effects in juries.153 However, none of the studies on
anchoring effects were performed on patent infringement cases.
Moreover, the concept of coherence has been studied even less in the
legal context. No studies have been conducted to show the general
coherence of jury valuations, let alone patent jury awards. Thus, there is

152. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008).
153. See supra notes 81–84.
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no proof that patent juries will give as much weight to the value of the
component as suggested.
Additionally, calculating damages is certainly more complex than
discussed in the model presented here.154 Even if contribution causes
juries to be more cognizant of the component price in their calculations,
it is unclear whether this effect will be sufficient to actually lower
royalty awards. This problem cries out for future empirical work to test
whether contribution will lower total royalty awards in component
cases.155
B. Changing Behavior
Contribution will also likely change parties‘ tactics in some
unpredictable ways. Patentees will have to decide whether to revise
their damages demand. If not, will they raise new arguments to justify
their demand in view of the component price? Will patentees seek 50%
from each party, or will they seek more from the infringer who sold the
more expensive product (e.g., the LCD TV manufacturer)? How will
the defendants ask the jury to assign their relative responsibilities?156
For example, could a manufacturer persuade a jury that its supplier bore
greater responsibility because the supplier was the one who included the
patented technology in its component? Alternatively, could the supplier
successfully argue that it should bear less responsibility because it was
only liable for contributory infringement and was not a direct infringer
like the multi-component manufacturer? If so, would juries assign less
responsibility to those defendants that are designated contributory,
rather than direct, infringers? These tactics could affect both how juries
apportion liability, and the size of the total award they issue.
The theory of contribution is not a one-way street. This article has
discussed how manufacturers could implead their component suppliers
and ask for contribution. Sometimes, the component manufacturer will
be the accused infringers. For example, the patent holder may also be a
154. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see
supra note 39 (listing the Georgia Pacific factors).
155. The author has received a small grant to begin studying how patent juries may react to
contribution theory.
156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23 cmt. e (1999).
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component supplier. In this situation, the patentee often will choose to
sue its competitor, another component supplier, and not the multicomponent product manufacturer who is often the patentee‘s customer
or potential customer too. An accused component supplier could
implead the manufacturer and ask for contribution. It is not clear how
often this will actually occur. After all, there is strong incentive for
component suppliers not to draw their customers into a lawsuit.
Nonetheless, this result could also change royalty awards in unforeseen
ways.
C. Indemnification
As discussed earlier, contribution does not apply if the parties already
negotiated an indemnification provision governing infringement.157 It is
unclear how this rule will apply to the various types of indemnification
provisions that exist today. For example, some suppliers agree to
provide indemnification so long as their components are not used in
combination with other products.158 Other agreements place monetary
caps on indemnification rights. It would appear that contribution rights
should apply only to those situations where there are no indemnification
rights (even if there are indemnification rights for other situations). For
all practical purposes, that situation is akin to having no indemnification
rights at all. However, contribution should not apply when there are
caps to avoid upsetting the relative share of the responsibility the parties
negotiated.
If contribution were adopted in patent law, parties may also adopt
new negotiating strategies.
Suppliers may start offering token
indemnification agreements to preempt contribution rights. This may
require patent law to revise the relationship between indemnification
and contribution. Patent law could reject the view of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts and allow a party to select between contribution and
indemnification. Alternatively, the law could simply provide a
mechanism to warn less sophisticated parties of the effect of such
157. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 23(c) (1999).
158. Intel provided a variation of this provision by purchasing a license that only extended to the
use of Intel‘s products by themselves. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617,
623–24 (2008).
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clauses. For example, before an indemnification clause could limit a
right to contribution, patent law could require the agreement to
specifically disclose that result. Finally, as suggested earlier, parties
may intentionally forego an indemnification agreement in hope of
reducing total damages awards and thus benefit both the component
supplier and its product manufacturer.
D. Extraterritoriality
The theory of contribution also has significant extraterritorial
implications. Component suppliers can be found both inside the United
States and abroad, particularly in Asia, but categorizing suppliers as
either domestic or foreign oversimplifies the issue. Many domestic
companies design components in the United States, but manufacture
them abroad. 159 Similarly, many foreign companies have a significant
U.S. presence.160 Thus, this article uses the term ―foreign supplier‖ to
refer to those suppliers that physically supply their components abroad.
Under this definition, many U.S companies may actually be foreign
suppliers. For the purposes of contribution theory, it will be important
to understand whether a foreign supplier could be found liable under any
infringement theory when their component ends up in a product that
infringes a patent in the United States.
Historically, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent laws has been
quite limited. Courts have found liability only for direct infringement
when someone ―makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any
patented invention . . . .‖161 In 1984, Congress amended the patent
statutes to encompass acts in the United States that aid infringement of a
159. For example, Silicon Image makes processors that help devices like televisions to
communicate using the HDMI standard. Although it is headquartered in Sunnyvale, California, Silicon
Image also has a research and center development center in Shanghai China. See Company Milestones,
SILICON IMAGE, http://www.siliconimage.com/aboutus/index.aspx?Page=11&Section=2 (last visited
Jan. 12, 2012).
160. For example, in Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246
F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001), TriTech manufactured audio CODEC chips in Singapore but also had
facilities in California. TriTech sold some of these chips to OPTi which in turn sold these chips to the
U.S. personal computer market.
161. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
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U.S. patent abroad. Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) imposes liability
for acts of inducement and contributory infringement within the United
States even though the act of direct infringement takes places abroad.162
In contrast, there is no provision in the patent statutes that explicitly
addresses whether companies can be liable for making and selling
components abroad when the later act of direct infringement takes place
in the United States. Section 271(c), which governs contributory
infringement, is the logical place to find such a prohibition. But that
statute explicitly requires that the acts constituting contributory
infringement take place in the United States.163
Under the current statutory framework, foreign suppliers may still be
held liable. For example, a manufacturer that is accused of infringement
in the United States may still be able to seek contribution from its
foreign suppliers under a theory of inducement. To establish liability for
inducement under § 271(b), the accused defendant must have known of
the patent, and actively and knowingly aided and abetted another's direct
infringement.164
Unlike direct infringement and contributory
infringement, inducement is not limited to activities that take place in
the United States.165
162. Id. at § 271(f) (―(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from
the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such
components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination
of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. (2) Whoever without
authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented
invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that
such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the
patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.‖).
163. Section 271(c) states that ―[w]hoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or
composition . . . shall be liable as a contributory infringer.‖ 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(c) (West 2010); see also
MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., No. C 01-4925 SBA, 2006 WL
463525, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2006) (noting that contributory infringement requires a sale within the
United States).
164. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
165. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(b) (West 2010) (―Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.‖); see also DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1305 (―Unlike direct infringement, which
must take place within the United States, induced infringement does not require any activity by the
indirect infringer in this country, as long as the direct infringement occurs here.‖).
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In fact, the Southern District of New York has already found that ―the
production and sale of an infringing product knowing that the buyer will
sell the product in the United States fit comfortably within this expanded
definition of inducement as ‗encouragement‘ or ‗aiding and
abetting.‘‖166 The Eastern District of Texas appears to agree.167
Although these decisions analyzed the production and sale of an entire
infringing product (i.e., acts that would constitute direct infringement if
performed within the United States), the same reasoning should apply to
foreign suppliers so long as the component being supplied is a material
part of the patented invention (i.e., acts that would constitute
contributory infringement if performed within the United States).168
Thus, the act of supplying a component abroad could trigger liability in
the United States. In addition, foreign suppliers often provide technical
support to their customers‘ design teams by helping the customers
incorporate the component into the end product. These acts could be
also considered acts of inducement triggering liability.
Manufacturers could also attempt to hold foreign suppliers liable for
offers for sale under § 271(a). Even when a foreign supplier physically
transfers its component abroad, that supplier may have conducted sales
activities in the United States. Sometimes foreign suppliers even have
U.S.-based sales offices. This tactic appears less promising in view of
the Federal Circuit‘s recent decision in Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling v. Maersk Contractors.169 In Transocean, the Federal Circuit
held that ―the location of the contemplated sale controls whether there is
an offer to sell within the United States.‖ Under this somewhat odd
rule, acts that appear to be an offer to sell in the United States would be

166. Wing Shing Prods. (BVI), Ltd., v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 2d 388,
411 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
167. Honeywell Int‘l, Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (stating
that ―liability [for foreign sales] will extend to CPT only if it actively induced infringement in the
United States by purposely availing itself of U.S. markets.‖).
168. There is a basis in the law for applying inducement to acts that normally would be considered
contributory infringement. See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent
Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 386 (2006) (noting that inducement
applied when there was evidence that a component with both infringing and noninfringing uses was sold
with the intent that it would be used to infringe a combination patent).
169. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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considered to take place abroad if the actual sale were found to be
abroad.170
However, the Federal Circuit has been inconsistent in interpreting the
reach of U.S. patent laws.171 In Transocean, the Federal Circuit said
that acts that took place abroad constituted an offer for sale in the United
States. Thus, the court was interpreting the reach of § 271(a)
expansively. It is unclear whether the Federal Circuit would use the
same analysis to limit the reach of § 271(a) and say that acts that take
place domestically would actually constitute offers for sale abroad. If
contribution theory is adopted in patent law, this issue will need to be
resolved.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has presented the multifaceted case for contribution in
patent law. From a doctrinal perspective, district courts have incorrectly
found that contribution is preempted by the statute governing
contributory infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). However, they have
arrived at this decision by wrongly conflating tort law‘s theory of
contribution and patent law‘s theory of contributory infringement. But
by itself, correcting this mistake does not provide the legal basis for
adopting contribution. The Supreme Court has said that courts have the
power to adopt contribution only in a particular area of federal
substantive law when certain criteria are met. Fortunately, patent law
fits squarely into one of the specified tests. The courts, not Congress,
have determined that infringers are jointly and severally liable.
Consequently, under Musick, Peeler, and Garrett, courts have the
authority to determine whether the ancillary theory of contribution
should also be adopted.
170. For example, a foreign semiconductor manufacturer‘s representatives could come to Silicon
Valley to sell chips to companies who design products there. Even though the offers to sell appear to
take place in the United States, Transocean suggests that the offer to sell might take place overseas so
long as the actual sale also took place outside the United States. This is often the case because many
electronic products are designed in the United States but are manufactured abroad. Consequently,
components are delivered to foreign factories.
171. Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2119, 2136–42 (2008) (discussing the Federal Circuit‘s inconsistent interpretation of the foreign reach
of various patent laws).
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The case for contribution does not rely on doctrinal arguments alone.
There are also compelling policy reasons for courts to adopt contribution
in patent law. Like it does in other areas of the law, applying
contribution in patent law will equitably spread liability among different
responsible parties. However, contribution will also provide a much less
expected benefit unique to patent law: it will lower royalty awards in
component patent cases, an area where awards have been shown to be
excessive.
Relying on the behavioral economics concepts of
―anchoring‖ and ―coherence,‖ this article has compared how juries act
under the current system with how they would behave under a patent
system applying contribution theory. This comparison shows that
contribution will lead to lower royalty awards that are based on the
value of the individual components and not the larger multi-component
products.
Of course this article only represents a first step. If contribution is
eventually adopted in patent law, it will undoubtedly have many
downstream effects. Hopefully, this will lead to a robust discussion in
many different areas including jury behavior, indemnification
agreements and the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent laws.
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